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CHOOSING BETWEEN NORMATIVE AND
DESCRIPTIVE VERSIONS OF THE
JUDICIAL ROLE
MICHAEL HERZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning a talk on writing, author Peter DeVries wondered why he
had been invited. Why, he asked, do people keep asking cows to discuss
milk? One might have the same doubts about judges' views of their craft.
However, several recent Supreme Court cases contain interesting and ex-
plicit holdings regarding the nature of the judicial role.
Every case implicitly raises questions about the role of judges in a de-
mocracy, and judges frequently offer comments on that role-usually well-
worn platitudes about the limited and apolitical nature of the judicial task.
In several cases from the 1990 Term, however, the Court was forced to
answer the question "What is a judge?," much more directly. In Gregory v.
Ashcroft,' the Court had to decide whether judges are "policymakers"
outside the coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). Chisom v. Roemer2 presented the question of whether judges are
"representatives," the elections for which are within the coverage of the
Voting Rights Act. The Court answered in the affirmative in both cases,
although not without a good deal of hedging. These results seem at odds
with the standard view of judges' governmental functions. After all, "rep-
resentative policymakers" are supposed to be in the other two branches of
government. Two other decisions from the 1990 Term, Payne v. Tennessee3
* Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. David Carlson, Marci Hamil-
ton, Pam Karlan, Ricky Revesz, and Chuck Yablon provided very helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
1. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
2. Ill S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
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and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia4 (Jim Beam), while not raising
the question of the judge's role so starkly, also brought the Court strikingly
close to a legislative model of judicial decisionmaking by discounting the
weight of precedent and, more or less, endorsing prospective decisions.
In each of these cases, the Court struggled between a normative, ideal-
ized view of judges as apolitical dispute-resolvers, and a descriptive, post-
realist recognition that in practice the judiciary exercises significant poli-
cymaking functions. The Court has frequently endorsed the idealized view
with fervor in recent years. Yet a majority of Justices rejected this view in
each of these cases, although it exerted a considerable tug. The Court's
inability to adhere to the terms of its own theory calls the theory itself into
question. If judges are "policymakers" and "representatives" who can
change the law freely and prospectively like a legislature, then how can they
be dispute resolvers who, lacking a constituency, decide questions of law
rather than policy? One answer is that they cannot; either the theory or the
decisions are wrong. A second is that the theory is purely normative, and
in these cases the Court was adhering to a descriptive vision of what judges
do. This Article explores whether it was correct to do so.
II. COURTS IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
The most familiar model of how courts should operate in a representa-
tive democracy-the "official version"-is that they leave policymaking to
the legislature and the executive. Governmental decisions as to what is ex-
pedient, useful, efficient, moral, or wealth-producing are made not by judges
but by the people's representatives. Courts exist to resolve disputes.' Their
decisions rest on the law rather than on personal preferences or public pres-
4. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
5. For a standard exposition of this position, see generally the lectures by former Senator Sam
Ervin in SAM J. ERVIN, JR. & RAMSEY CLARK, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: POLICYMAKER
OR ADJUDICATOR (1970). A more recent and scholarly statement of essentially the same idea is
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 3-28 (1991). Professor
Redish sees the core constraint on judicial authority as being "the Representational principle":
The Representational principle posits that, within constitutionally established boundaries,
the representative branches of government may make policy decisions, free from judicial
power to ignore or overrule them simply on grounds of social, political, or moral disagree-
ment. This principle flows from the fundamental values underlying democratic systems in
general and the American system in particular: the right of the populace to have basic
policy choices made by representatives whom it has chosen and whom it may replace if, on
balance, their policy choices do not coincide with the wishes of a majority of the electorate.
Id. at 4.
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sure, on "judgment" rather than on "will." 6 Put anachronistically, courts
find the law while legislatures make the law. The differing roles of judge
and legislator are captured in the fact that "ideology [is] the most exalted
motive that most theories attribute to legislators [but] the basest motive
generally attributed to judges, and the one that virtually all theories of judi-
cial decisionmaking strive to eliminate."7 In a representative democracy,
policy decisions are legitimated only by popular delegation or consent.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has shown renewed enthusiasm for
this model. For example, Erwin Chemerinsky has detailed the Court's
"majoritarian paradigm" for constitutional decisions, under which the
Court sees its essential mission as getting out of the way of legislative ma-
jorities.' This view of the judiciary is also central to the Court's calls for
deference to administrative agencies' elaborations of ambiguous statutes.
The Court states that fleshing out vague, standardless enactments involves
questions of policy, not law, and therefore is best done by a part of the
government with at least a measure of democratic accountability-officials
who, unlike judges, have a constituency.9 Judges should not decide cases
on the basis of their "personal policy preferences," whereas it is "entirely
appropriate" for the executive branch to do so because the Chief Executive
is "directly accountable to the people."' 10 In short, the Court has a tidy
political theory in which election, representation, and policymaking are
linked; judges are apolitical law-appliers wholly outside that constellation.
This model of judicial decisionmaking is open to two obvious criticisms.
The first is that the model is empirically false. Although judges say their
hands are tied by external, neutral norms, the fact is that they merely apply
6. THE FEDERALiST No. 78, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987); see also
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Courts
are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.").
7. Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 56-57 (1991).
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989).
A belief in aggressive judicial enforcement of countermajoritarian constitutional provisions is not
necessarily inconsistent with the conviction that policy should be made in the political branches.
Policymaking must still occur within constitutional limits, either broad or narrow. For the cur-
rent Court, however, narrow readings of individual rights and doubts about a policymaking judici-
ary are linked by their common normative foundation: Majoritarian agreement is the necessary
and sufficient condition of governmental authority.
9. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); see generally Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L.
REV. 469 (1985) (endorsing Chevron in light of political theory that requires policy decisions to be
made by electorally accountable officials).
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
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their own policy preferences. The secret has been out for some time," and
the cases I will discuss provide handy illustrations. For example, one strik-
ing aspect of these cases is that the Court's liberal old guard suddenly dis-
covered judicial humility. Only recently, one distinguishing characteristic
of the liberal wing seemed to be that it was not constantly urging that judges
avoid imposing their own values.' 2 That is not what it looks like in these
opinions. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 3 Justices Marshall and Blackmun, alone
among the nine, paint a picture of judges humbly resolving disputes accord-
ing to external standards, and not making policy. 14 They were again united
against the rest of the Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 5 invoking precedent
and stare decisis and warning of the dangers of judges mistaking their per-
sonal predilections for the law.' 6 Finally, in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia,I7 Justices Marshall and Blackmun were joined by Justice Scalia, of
all people, in insisting, against the other six members of the Court, that
judges find law rather than make it, that they thus lack the power to change
the law, and that Article III forbids prospective decisions because that is
not how the common law operated in the eighteenth century.'8
These opinions are the liberal minority's desperate attempts to erect
doctrinal barriers to the dismantling of the Warren (and Burger) Court edi-
fice. In decrying the majority's decisionmaking as resting on policy rather
than principle, and in offering this new-found and extraordinarily conserva-
tive vision of the judicial role instead, Justices Marshall and Blackmun pro-
vide a pretty good indication that judicial reasoning is result-oriented and
that doctrine-in this case doctrine about the judicial function-is driven
by considerations of policy.' 9
11. The jurisprudential debate triggered by the Realists' attack on the concept of rules-bound
judicial decisionmaking is lucidly set out in Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An
Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 235-44 (1990).
12. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 51 n.28.
13. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
14. Id. at 2415 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
15. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
16. Id. at 2619-25 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also filed
a dissent, which Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at 2625.
17. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
18. Id. at 2449-50 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
19. In making these comments about Justices Marshall and Blackmun, I do not mean in any
way to suggest that the same could not be said of the other Justices. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green,
"Power, Not Reason": Justice Marshall's Valedictory and the Fourth Amendment in the Supreme
Court's 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373 (1992) (arguing powerfully that the reasoning, treatment
of precedent, and results in the Court's search and seizure decisions can be explained only by a
policy that the government should always win); see also infra note 54.
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This familiar criticism is important but incomplete. The realist account
of judicial decisionmaking does not directly contradict the "official" ver-
sion, since the former is descriptive, the latter prescriptive. It is not incon-
sistent (or uncommon) to say that judges do make law but they should not,
or should to the least extent possible, or should in the manner which least
impinges on legislative authority. Indeed, that is what Chevron says.20 My
aim is not to criticize the Court's normative vision as descriptively inaccu-
rate. Rather, I will develop the idea that these two versions of the judicial
role, although in tension, coexist in the Court's own theory of the judicial
role. The question becomes when and why it chooses to look to one or the
other.
The second evident line of attack on the Court's model of an apolitical
judiciary is that it is mistaken on the merits; judges should pursue a rela-
tively active, policy-based agenda.2" If this criticism is correct, then the
tension between the real and the ideal dissolves.22 This too is not my argu-
ment. For present purposes, I accept the Court's ideal as an ideal, but also
deem it unachievable in practice.
20. Although it involves the Court's normative, apolitical vision of the courts, the Chevron
opinion is essentially functionalist rather than formalist. The formalist view would be that judges
interpret statutes, saying "what the law is." Chevron says that, in practice, adherence to that
formal arrangement conflicts with the underlying constitutional structure, which places poli-
cymaking in the hands of accountable actors. Recognizing that judges are forced by standardless
legislation to make policy, it shifts what is technically a judicial function to another policymaking
branch in order to preserve the underlying balance. Indeed, this mix of a functionalist approach
with a strong normative view is what makes Chevron, for all its flaws, such a strong opinion.
21. A prominent strand of current scholarship does seem, in the words of one harsh critic, to
treat courts as no different than legislatures. See John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitu-
tional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L.
REV. 833, 834-42 (1991). For a provocatively explicit example, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. Rv. 1 (1978).
22. Quite similar questions, shifted a few degrees toward politics, arise with regard to the role
of the Solicitor General (SG). Traditionally, the SG is seen as having obligations to the Court and
to "the law" that are at least as strong as his duties to the President. Although the SG's pursuit of
a relatively active, policy-based agenda in recent administrations has come under attack, see, eg.,
LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1987), it can also be argued that the SG's essential duty is to advance the legal positions and
jurisprudential beliefs of the President. If that is the normative model, then there is no tension
with the reality of a "politicized" SG's office (except to the extent that the SG is insufficiently
dedicated to the President's views). See generally John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics:
The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799
(1992).
1992]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:725
III. JUDGES As POLICYMAKERS
Modeled directly after Title VII,23 the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA) forbids employers to discriminate on the basis of age,
such as by imposing mandatory retirement. 24 The Act covers state employ-
ees, but not one "elected to public office ... or an appointee on the poli-
cymaking level."2 5  Gregory v. Ashcroft 26 upheld Missouri's requirement
that appointed state judges retire at age seventy on the ground that judges
are not covered by the ADEA.
A. The Gregory Opinions
As this issue worked its way through the lower courts, the principal
area of dispute was whether judges are exempt from the ADEA because
they are policymakers.27 However, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
placed this issue somewhat in the background. She began with a lengthy
discourse on federalism and the Tenth Amendment, emphasizing that the
states must retain the authority to determine the qualifications of their most
important officials. She did not conclude that the Tenth Amendment for-
bids federal intrusion on the states' methods of selecting and retaining
judges, although one cannot avoid the sense that Justice O'Connor and
many of those who joined her would be happy to so hold.2 8 Rather, she
23. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-56 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (1988)). For discussion of Title VII's role as
the model for the ADEA, see Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
26. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
27. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that exception does not
apply because "courts are called upon primarily to fathom the nature and contours of policies
established by the legislative and executive branches rather than to create or fashion new policy");
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that exception does apply
because "judges must exercise the same sort of discretion in deisionmaking... that is required of
'appointee[s] on the policymaking level' in the executive and legislative branches"), affid, 111 S.
Ct. 2395 (1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that exception
does apply because "'policymaking' is indisputably a part of the function of judging"). Read
narrowly, these statements are not contradictory. Judges are "called upon"-by history, separa-
tion of powers, and received understandings-to act as the Second Circuit says, but in attempting
to do so they also "indisputably" end up exercising policymaking discretion, as the First and
Eighth Circuits say.
28. Indeed, they have said as much. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (predicting that constitutional immunity for state
employees from federal regulation "will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a
majority of this Court"); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The State of Missouri urged the
Court to use this case to overrule Garcia. Brief for Respondents at 35-37, Gregory v. Ashcroft,
111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
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relied on federalism principles to impose a "plain statement" rule:29 Con-
gress cannot forbid mandatory retirement for state judges except with an
utter clarity missing from the ADEA. This approach allowed the Court to
avoid deciding whether judges are actually "on the policymaking level." 3
The opinion simply summarizes the contentions of the parties, giving a
good deal more attention to the State's position than the petitioners' posi-
tion, and finds that "[ilt is at least ambiguous whether a state judge is an
'appointee on the policymaking level.' "31 Under the plain statement rule,
that ambiguity precludes application of the ADEA to judges.32
Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the judgment but
rejected the plain statement rule.33 Addressing the statutory issue without
a federalist thumb on the scales, he concluded that the Act exempts state
judges. Judges-certainly common law judges-are inescapably policy-
makers; at the very least, they are "on the policymaking level." A few
shreds of Title VII legislative history also suggested that Congress adopted
this provision out of concern that the definition of employee not reach high
ranking officials, including judges.34
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed with Justice White
about the plain statement rule, but disagreed about the meaning of the stat-
ute. He argued that judges are not policymakers; their primary task is to
resolve disputes by "apply[ing] rules reflecting the policy choices made by,
or on behalf of, those elected to legislative and executive positions. '35 Jus-
tice Blackmun also offered his own reading of the legislative history and, as
if to reinforce the point that policymaking authority lies outside the judicial
branch, invoked a different sort of plain statement rule: Judges should ac-
cept plausible agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.36
29. "This plain statement rule is nothing more than an acknowledgement that the states re-
tain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress
does not readily interfere." Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2401.
30. Id. at 2398.
31. Id. at 2404.
32. Writing for seven Justices, Justice O'Connor made short work of the petitioners' equal
protection argument. Id at 2406-08.
33. Justice White argued that federalism requires at most a plain statement that the statute as
a whole applies to state governments, a statement Congress indisputably made in the ADEA.
Congress cannot be required to make a separate "plain statement" in each specific provision. Id.
at 2409-11 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). He also found any plain statement approach
out of place when Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
2411-12.
34. Id at 2412-14.
35. Id. at 2415 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36. Id at 2415-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1992]
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There is a certain irony in seeing Justices White and Blackmun have this
dispute about judicial policymaking given their opinions in Roe v. Wade.37
Whatever one's view of the merits of that decision, it is hard to think of a
clearer example of the Supreme Court's role as policymaker.38 Justice
Blackmun's Roe opinion was a frank "policy" sort of opinion; it had no real
basis in the constitutional text or the Court's precedents and drew "legisla-
tive" types of lines. That was precisely Justice White's complaint in dis-
sent.39 Now, two decades later, Justice White stresses the important
policymaking function of the judiciary and Justice Blackmun-the diffi-
dent, shy person's judge-protests that judges merely resolve disputes and
are not charged with doing what he did in Roe v. Wade, namely, "fash-
ion[ing] broad policies establishing the rights and duties of citizens."'  Of
course, in Roe, Justice Blackmun said that the Court's task was "to resolve
the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilec-
tion."41 This was one of the cases, however, in which such a disclaimer
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. See generally DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS 23-61 (2d ed. 1990) (recounting story of Roe as part of description of Court as a
"superlegislature").
39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting) (decision "an improvident and extravagant
exercise" of "raw judicial power" with "scarcely any reason or authority"). Justice White's rheto-
ric implies a particular vision of the judicial role. Judges should go no further than reason and
authority take them; they should not (unlike a legislature) be exercising raw power. This is the
usual rhetoric of the losing side. It resurfaced with eerie similarity in Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which all but overruled Roe.
Sounding just like Justice White a decade and a half before, Justice Blackmun described the ma-
jority opinion as one in which "[b]ald assertion masquerades as reasoning. The object, quite
clearly, is not to persuade, but to prevail." Webster, 492 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
He went on: "This it-is-so-because-we-say-so jurisprudence constitutes nothing other than an at-
tempted exercise of brute force; reason, much less persuasion, has no place." Id. at 552. Two
years later it was Justice Marshall's turn: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's
decisionmaking." Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Each dissent implies an almost Blackstonian understanding of the judi-
cial task as involving the application of precedent and pure reason, in contrast to the legislature's
pursuit of preference and power. See also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
40. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2415 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In fact Justice White generally
has not shied away from the reality of the Supreme Court as policymaker, even when objecting to
the policy it is making. Dissenting in Miranda, for example, he observed that the majority was
making
new law and new public policy in much the same way that [the Court] has in the course of
interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court... must do
and will continue to do unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional
distribution of governmental powers.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
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merely "signal[s] that the court is about to impose a value choice so contro-
versial that denial is easier than explanation."42
B. Accepting Judicial Policymaking
Only a court would consider whether judges are "on the policymaking
level" a difficult question. At the very least, the Gregory plaintiffs' com-
mon-law functions involve policymaking. 3 It has been some time since
anyone seriously subscribed to the notion that the common law is a pre-
existing denizen of "some Aladdin's Cave" to which mortals gain access
when appointment to the judiciary gives them "knowledge of the magic
words Open Sesame."'  Common law is made by judges alone. Therefore,
the subversive view of the judicial function-that judges make policy-has
become the official version. 5 Consider the revolution in products liability
law over the last generation. These decisions rest on explicit policy consid-
erations-who has superior information, inequality of bargaining power,
42. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1204 (1987). On the invocation of objectivity as a pure honorific to
bolster an otherwise subjective argument, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1 (1992).
43. "Policymaking" is not defined by the statute. I take it to mean deciding on a particular
course of action based on considerations of utility to, or the values of, the community as a whole.
Cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1979) ("Arguments of policy justify a
political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the
community as a whole.").
Justice White's definition was a good deal broader: "'Policy' is defined as 'a definite course or
method of action selected.., from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide
and usually determine present and future decisions.'" Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2412 (White, J.,
concurring) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1754 (1976)).
Judges do make policy in this sense, but so do game wardens, or the maintenance employees who
decide where to order cleaning supplies, neither of whom a court is likely to find exempt from
ADEA protection. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). The dictionary definition misses
what must be critical features of policymaking in this setting, namely, that policy reflects an evalu-
ation of the benefit of a given course of action to the community as a whole or a significant portion
thereof and that it be made on behalf of or directly affect the community.
44. Lord Reid, The Judge as Lawmaker, 12 J. Soc. PUB. TEACHERS L. (New Series) 22
(1972), quoted in Roger Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Re-
sponsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535-36 n.7 (1977).
45. Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in
the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 876 (1991); see also PHILIP L. DUBOIS,
FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 23-27 (1980). For a rather stunning description of judges as policy-
makers, see generally RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESs: How BUSINESS CAN
BE RESCUED FROM THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1988). Judge Neely, who sits on the
Supreme Court of West Virginia, views judges as wholly political actors, noting, for example, that
"[t]he major difference between courts and other political institutions.., is that it is not usually
smart to try to bribe appointed judges." Id. at 14.
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the role of insurers, and so on." Critics have responded in the same terms.
They do not contend that the courts have exceeded their proper institu-
tional role. They simply argue that the doctrinal innovations either pursue
the wrong policy or will not achieve the policy results for which they aim.'
Once the fiction of "found" common law is abandoned, the tension between
the normative and descriptive models abates-courts are, and should be,
policymakers." It is not surprising, then, that in arguing that judges are
policymakers, Justice White focuses solely on common-law courts. That
focus permits him to avoid choosing between the normative and the de-
scriptive, as might be necessary in considering judges as interpreters of the
Constitution or statutes.
The fact that the Gregory plaintiffs were common-law judges makes one
wonder how there could be any hesitation about whether they fell within
the statutory exception. Perhaps part of the explanation is that the federal
judges deciding these cases have quite a different docket. In federal cases,
the view that judges should not make policy is much more substantial. A
statutory or constitutional provision is almost always at issue. While inter-
pretation may still lead to judicial policymaking in practice, at least an iden-
tifiable nonjudicial lawmaker exists. In contrast to the common-law setting,
the notion that judges simply implement the policy decisions made by
others is at least plausible. Perhaps the Court's failure to focus on the
plaintiffs' common-law functions arose from a sense that in practice com-
mon-law decisionmaking is not so very different from statutory and consti-
tutional decisionmaking. By most accounts federal judges also function as
46. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical
Analysis of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1570 (1991). Henderson's data,
reflecting 2,500 judicial products liability opinions, show courts explicitly relying on policy in
"only" 15% of the cases. Id. at 1612. Fifteen percent is, I would say, a pretty high number for a
system handling many routine cases and purporting to be based on precedent rather than starting
from first principles in each case.
47. See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1077 (1965); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 681 (1980); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825 (1973).
48. There remains the objection, and it can be powerful, that although judges say they are
pursuing sound public policy, in fact they are merely imposing their own prejudices. Alterna-
tively, the critical observer might conclude that the judge is pursuing public policy, but views of
what constitutes good policy are inescapably a function of race, class, background, and psychol-
ogy. It is an overgeneralization, but one could say that the first of these distinguishable positions
(law is not found, it reflects public policy) is that of Holmes, the second that of the realists, and
the third that of the critical legal scholars. Strangely, under these latter views, unlike under the
Court's conception, the normative model supports the result in Gregory, the descriptive undercuts
[Vol. 75:725
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policymakers.49 If so, then the Court's failure to focus on the common-law
role of the Missouri courts suggests a lack of confidence in its normative
view of the federal judicial role because of its descriptive weakness.
In fact, Justice O'Connor did say that state judges are policymakers, she
just was unwilling to do so in the part of her opinion that actually involved
that question. Her Tenth Amendment discourse relied heavily on a line of
equal protection cases in which the Court had backed away from its initial,
confident announcement that aliens are a suspect class ° and established a
"political function" exception to strict scrutiny. These cases lowered the
standard of review for citizenship requirements for "elective or important
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions [whose operations]
go to the heart of representative government."51 Specifically, mere rational-
ity review applies if the position to which the citizenship requirement is
attached is "policy-making"; hence, strict scrutiny applies to a citizenship
requirement for notaries public but not to one for probation officers. 2 In
borrowing from the political function cases to apply a Tenth Amendment-
based plain statement rule for federal regulation of judges, Justice
O'Connor thus decided the case without acknowledging that she did so.
She concluded that judges are the kind of officials to which a state could
attach a citizenship requirement because of their "political function." 3
They are therefore policymakers5 4
49. On the role of policy in constitutional decisionmaking, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Con-
stitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Fallon, supra note 42, at 1243-
46. For relatively bold calls for-judicial policymaking in statutory cases, see GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (1990). The respondents in Gregory, displaying either strategic advocacy or the
deep sincerity of their conviction that judges are policymakers, even when interpreting a statute,
devoted a section of their brief to the proposition that exempting judges from the ADEA "is
consistent with sound principles of public policy." Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
50. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
51. Sugarman v. Dougal, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973) (emphasis added); accord Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1982).
52. Bernal, 467 U.S. at 227; Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439-40.
53. Although none directly involved judges, the cases on which she relies also took this view
of the judiciary. See, e.g., Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647; id. at 661 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that "policymaking for a political community" involves "judges"). The author of Sugarman
was Justice Blackmun, whose view of the centrality of judges to the functioning of representative
government in that opinion seems inconsistent with his description of the judicial role in his dis-
sent in Gregory.
54. Justice O'Connor's reliance on the Tenth Amendment might show judges (or at least
these five Justices) to be policymakers in a second way as well. This view of federalism, it has been
argued, has no foundation in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution, but simply reflects
the Justices' "own conception of proper public policy." Dean Alfange, Jr., Congressional Regula-
tion of the "States Qua States" From National League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 S. CT.
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One striking aspect of Gregory, then, is how subversive the idea of the
policymaking judge remains. Only two Justices actually stated that judges
make policy, and even they soft-pedalled by (1) noting that the statute re-
quired only that judges be "on the policymaking level," not that they actu-
ally be policymakers, 5 (2) focusing solely on judges' common-law
functions, and (3) using a dictionary definition of "policy" that was so use-
lessly broad as to make the description of judges as policymakers uncon-
troversial. 6 Five Justices skirted the issue, even though they implicitly
endorsed precisely this view of courts elsewhere, and two flat-out denied
that policy was part of judicial decisionmaking.
This reluctance stems from the fact that the view of judges as policy-
makers conflicts with the present Court's highly majoritarian and deferen-
tial description of its own role. Unelected judges are not accountable to the
public and policy choices may legitimately be made only by the people's
representatives.5 7 Against the background of its statements that what dis-
tinguishes courts is that they lack an electoral constituency and, therefore,
do not make political decisions, it would have been quite awkward for the
Court to suddenly announce that judges do make policy. Perhaps because
questions of the Court's own legitimacy revolve almost entirely around con-
REV. 215, 216. It is also tempting to characterize the votes on the merits in Gregory, which
conveniently align with the Justices' individual enthusiasm, of lack thereof, for civil rights legisla-
tion in general, as based on policy considerations.
Throughout (or almost throughout) this article, I avoid that common and easy critique, focus-
ing instead on the Court's explicit statements about the judicial role. The two issues come to-
gether with an irony too stunning to resist, however, in Solicitor General Robert Bork's argument
in National League of Cities. Arguing for the constitutionality of applying federal minimum wage
and maximum hour standards to state employees, Bork conceded that federal regulation of the
salaries of certain "policymaking" officials might exceed Congress's power. He also said that state
judges might be immune from federal regulation, provoking the following exchange:
Q: But judges [do] not make policy generally.
MR. BORK: There is a school of thought centered in the Yale Law School, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, that suggest[s] that they do occasionally. But I was trying to prevent it in this
case. [Laughter.]
Q: Touche.
Transcript of Reargument at 63, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see also
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities) ("Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'neces-
sary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make
decisions about which state policies it favors and which it dislikes.").
55. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2413 (1991) (White, J., concurring). The majority
took the same tack. Id. at 2404.
56. See supra note 43.
57. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text; see generally DWORKIN, supra note 43, at
84-85; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Can-
dor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
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stitutional decisionmaking, the Court failed to see that concerns over judi-
cial policymaking are, if not inconsequential, at least greatly attenuated
outside that arena.5" The Court hewed closely to the image of judges as
expositors rather than creators of the law, or at least as closely as it could
without actually affirming it.
In contrast, the public function cases on which Justice O'Connor relied
are explicit in determining the level of scrutiny in light of the actual rather
than theoretical role of the official.5 9 This is the sensible approach to take
in assessing the constitutionality of a state statute. Indeed, Justice
O'Connor took precisely that approach in evaluating the constitutionality
of Missouri's mandatory retirement law.' It is clearly rational for a state
legislature to view the world as it really is rather than as it is supposed to
be. In addition, absent some actual indication to the contrary, it should be
assumed that the legislature was concerned with the actual functioning of
state officials. What counts in interpreting the ADEA, or any statute, is
how judges function in the real world. Given the general consensus both on
and off the Court that judges do make policy, the Court should not have
shied away from this reality in interpreting the statute. The opinion would
have been far stronger had it acknowledged directly rather than only im-
plicitly that in the real world judges are policymakers. The descriptive
rather than the normative model should control in interpreting a statute or
assessing its constitutionality.
58. In theory, the legislature's power to reverse nonconstitutional judicial decisions eliminates
concern over judicial overreaching. The legislature may be deemed to have handed the poli-
cymaking function to the courts, or at least to have accepted the courts' assumption of that func-
tion. In practice, of course, legislative correction is not so straightforward. Nonetheless,
legislative silence at least in part reflects "either lack of political interest or some vague sense that
the problems are being adequately handled by the courts." Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and
Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REv. 991, 1005 (1977); see also ELY, supra note 57, at 4. Further-
more, precisely because the legislature lacks the time and energy to resolve every question, judicial
refusal to make policy determinations is not necessarily a favor to the legislature, which may have
sought the very judicial elaboration the court now refuses to provide. Michael Herz, Textualism
and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1679-80 &
n.80 (1991). Duncan Kennedy describes "standards," as opposed to "rules," as just such a poli-
cymaking delegation to the judiciary. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textual-
ism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 677 (1990) (noting conscious congressional delegations to courts).
59. E.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
60. The Court relied on judges' "general lack of accountability" to justify mandatory retire-
ment for them but not other, more easily removed, officials. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395,
2407 (1991). It noted that in theory the judges are accountable, because they are subject to peri-
odic recall elections. Yet recall elections are not a meaningful check because the judges do not
operate in the public eye and usually run unopposed. Furthermore, impeachment is impractical.
In concluding that judges are not accountable, the Court thus focused on the practical rather than
theoretical relationship between the judges and their ostensible constituents. Id.
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IV. JUDGES AS REPRESENTATIVES
In Chisom v. Roemer, the Court had to decide whether elected judges
are "representative." If judges are policymakers, and/or if they rank
among the states' most important officials, whose selection must be left en-
tirely to the citizens of the states, then it would be peculiar if they, at least
those who are elected, were not the people's representatives.61 In light of
the Court's view of election as the necessary and sufficient condition of ac-
countability, representation, and legitimate policymaking, Chisom v. Roe-
mer should have been an easy case. Yet, as in Gregory, the Court would not
surrender its model of an apolitical judiciary so easily.
Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act62 outlaws any voting standard,
practice, or procedure that denies the right to vote in any election on ac-
count of race. Under section l(b), a violation of section 2(a) is established if
the members of a class of citizens "have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect rep-
resentatives of their choice."63 Section 2(b) thus establishes a "results test"
for section 2(a) violations, overruling Mobile v. Bolden," which had re-
quired a showing of discriminatory purpose to establish a violation of the
Act. The question in Chisom v. Roemer was whether section 2(b) applies to
elections for judges. The State argued that section 2(b) applies only when a
class is unable "to elect representatives of their choice,"65 and judges are not
"representatives." 66
Against the background of the Court's recent model of the judicial role,
Chisom forced the Court to navigate between the Scylla of abandoning its
view of judges as independent and apolitical and the Charybdis of aban-
doning its belief in a straightforward linkage of election with accountability
and legitimate policymaking. When the issue of elected judges had briefly
61. The standard justification for electing judges is that "judges make policy [and] ... like
other policymakers, they should be accountable to the people in a representative political system."
David Adamany & Philip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 731, 772, 778.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
64. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
66. Until the Fifth Circuit's en banc ruling reviewed in Chisom, the lower courts had consist-
ently held that section 2(b) did apply to judicial elections. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275
(6th Cir. 1988); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988); Ewing v. Monroe County
Mississippi, 740 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Miss. 1990); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala. 1989); Williams v. State Bd. of Elections, 696 F. Supp.
1563 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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surfaced once before, the first view had triumphed.67 This time it was the
belief in popular electoral control that prevailed. In an opinion by Justice
Stevens, the Court held that section 2(b) does apply to judicial elections.
Reasoning circularly, it read "representatives" to refer to "the winners of
representative, popular elections,"" a reading confirmed by the fact that
the judges had to be residents of, and were elected by voters from, particu-
lar geographic districts.6 9 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy, dissented. He argued that the ordinary meaning of
"representatives" does not include judges, who do not act on behalf of the
people in the way that legislators or executive officials do.70 Although Jus-
tices Stevens and Scalia were both unhappy with the idea of popular influ-
ence on the judiciary, Justice Stevens saw it as an inevitable reality in a
system of elected judges, whereas Justice Scalia insisted that a judge, elected
or appointed, "represents the Law-which often requires him to rule
against the People."71
A. Judges and Popular Opinion
For purposes of deciding the statutory issue, the Court could have be-
gun and ended with the fact that these judges are elected.72 The Act's es-
sential protection, as its title indicates, is of the right to vote. Section 2(a)
reaches all elections and there is no obvious reason why section 2(b), which
67. This was in a summary affirmance of a district court ruling that the one-person-one-vote
principle does not apply in judicial elections. The district court had reasoned that judges "serve"
the people rather than "represent" them and, therefore, a rule designed to ensure the integrity of
representative government does not apply to judicial elections. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp.
453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972). The case fell within the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.
Over three dissents, the Court affirmed without briefing, argument, or opinion. 409 U.S. 1095
(1973). Wells is typical of the lower courts' treatment of this issue. See generally Andrew S.
Marovitz, Note, Casting a Meaningful Ballot: Applying One-Person, One- Vote to Judicial Elections
Involving Racial Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 1193, 1199-1202 (1989). For these courts, judges
"are not representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the executive. Their function is to
administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency." Stokes v. Fortson, 234
F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964); accord Buchanan v. Gilligan, 349 F. Supp. 569, 571 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); New York State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). This logic is pure Chevron. There Justice Stevens wrote: "Courts must, in some
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judge's personal policy
preferences.... [Flederal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).
68. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2366 (1991).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2372 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. d
72. See LULAC v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 657 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Johnson, J., dis-
senting); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250 (1lth Cir. 1987).
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merely explains how a violation of section 2(a) is established, should be any
less extensive. It is not an oversimplication to say that if there is an election
for public office, the Voting Rights Act applies.73 Reduced to its essence,
this is what Justice Stevens said. Specifically, however, he treated the refer-
ence to "representatives" as a limitation on the elections section 2(b)
reaches. He then concluded that judges fall within that subset of all elected
officials, primarily because they are elected. The flaw in this reasoning is
that if "representatives" is a term of limitation, then election alone cannot
make an official a representative; the premise is that there are elections for
officials who are not representatives.
Even apart from the particular wording of this provision, the mere fact
that judges are elected cannot in itself make them representatives.74 That
label depends not on whether judges are elected, but on what they are
elected to do. To be representatives, judges must act on behalf of or be
responsive to the public. Citing himself as authority,75 Justice Stevens ex-
plains why they meet this test: To win elections, judges must be sensitive to
the popular will, which means reaching substantive results that will meet
with popular approval.76 Thus, elected judges will follow majority (or vocal
minority) policy preferences, making law rather than finding it. This is the
obvious move for the author of Chevron, reaffirming the equation of elec-
tion, responsiveness, and representation.
At least in theory, however, an elected judiciary need not consist of un-
constrained law-makers. The electorate might believe that judges should
ignore popular sentiment regarding specific legal or policy issues. If so,
judges who make policy, even in the name of the people, would then go
down to defeat at the polls.77 Indeed, the fact that the public's elected rep-
73. The "vote" that the Act protects is defined to "include all action necessary to make a vote
effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to .... casting a
ballot, and having such ballot counted properly . . . with respect to candidates for public...
office." 42 U.S.C. § 1973()(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). This comprehensive definition makes
it clear that no election of a government official is excluded from the Act's coverage.
74. HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 116 (1967). As Justice Scalia re-
torted, with his usual sarcasm and more than his usual effectiveness, by that definition "the fan-
elected members of the baseball All-Star teams are 'representatives.'" Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2372
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2367 n.29 (citing John Paul Stevens, The Office of an Office, 55 CHI.
BAR REC. 276, 280, 281 (1974)).
76. Id. at 2367. The same general idea emerges in Justice Stevens's dissents in Baldwin v.
Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1985), and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14 (1984)
(expressing concern that an elected judge will be unable to ignore jury's recommendation of death
sentence, especially since jury is the voice of the community).
77. J. Roland Pennock has pointed out that even if the representative is an agent, bound to
support what a majority of her constituency desires, "[d]esires, of course, need not be self-regard-
ing; they may relate to the realization of ideals." J. Roland Pennock, Political Representation: An
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resentative in the White House has found it politically expedient to promise
that his judicial nominees will find law rather than make it7" suggests that
the public might vote directly for judicial candidates who made the same
promise.7 9 It is not inconceivable that the majority would see it as in its
interest if the legislature made policy and judges were neutral servants of
the law, especially since, as the majority, it controls the legislative
policymakers.
Justice Stevens also mentions in passing that Louisiana judges are se-
lected from separate geographical districts. The implication is that geo-
graphic division reflects, or creates, conflicting interests and invites judges
to identify with those of their particular constituencies. This belief has an
impressive pedigree. For one, it underlies diversity jurisdiction,80 which re-
flects the assumption that state judges will favor and protect the interests of
their fellow citizens. In other words, they are representatives. Any tribalist
tendency to favor fellow citizens is significantly enhanced if the judge is
elected, since one litigant may vote for her and the other cannot vote
against her."1 Nonetheless, hailing from separate districts does not neces-
sarily mean that judges will or should pursue only that narrow interest.
First, the geographic diversity resulting from this requirement can be seen
as merely an assurance that the courts are "representative" in the sense of
being typical, just as Presidents avoid having too many Supreme Court Jus-
tices from any one state, or seek a Cabinet that "looks like America." Sec-
ond, a longstanding thread of political theory, one that is especially
appropriate as applied to judges, holds that an official owes a duty of repre-
sentation not toward the home district but to the entire state or nation. 2
Overview, in NoMos X: REPRESENTATION 3, 12 n. 19 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1968). This account of a non-policymaking elected judiciary would be an example.
78. In announcing his nomination of Justice Souter, for example, President Bush promised
that the nominee "is committed to interpreting, not making the law." Comments by President on
His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at Al8 (transcript of press conference). In the
ensuing question and answer period, he reiterated six separate times that the nominee would "in-
terpret the Constitution" rather than "legislate from the bench." Id. The President was following
a long tradition. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 14 (2d ed. 1985)
(recounting President Nixon's similar assurances on nominating Chief Justice Burger).
79. The point is significantly undercut by the fact that the President is appointing judges with
life tenure.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies
... between Citizens of different States ... ."); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
81. Judge Neely states that local plaintiffs, who can vote in state judicial elections, enjoy an
advantage over out of state defendants, who "can't even be relied upon to send a campaign contri-
bution." NEELY, supra note 45, at 62.
82. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in LEGISLATIVE POLITICS, U.S.A. 11
(Theodore J. Lowi ed., 2d ed. 1965); see also Pennock, supra note 77, at 12-13.
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In short, it is easy to construct a model of an elected judiciary that does
not consist of "representatives" as understood by Justice Stevens. Given
Justice Stevens's dismay over popular influence on the judiciary, 3 the
model should appeal to him. Yet, like the majority in Gregory, Chisom ulti-
mately looked not to a theoretical model, but to a perceived practical real-
ity. The extent to which elected judges do in fact respond to popular
pressure is unclear. Judicial elections are notoriously ineffective tools for
popular control given the lack of any real debate between opposing candi-
dates (if not the lack of opposing candidates themselves), the generally
small and uninformed electorate, and the frequency with which judges in an
elective scheme are in fact appointed to fill vacancies.8 4 Furthermore,
judges' terms tend to be sufficiently long, and recall elections sufficiently
irrelevant, to render judges practically unaccountable once in office. The
Gregory Court made just this point.8 5 Nonetheless, there is some support,
both intuitive and empirical, for Justice Stevens's view of the world.86 More
importantly, the question for the Court was not the empirical one of
whether elected judges do in fact heed popular sentiment, but the legal one
of whether Congress thought they would do so. With regard to that ques-
tion, the Court was clearly correct. Without a lengthy review of the Act
and its history, the key point is that it would have been a mistake to read
the Act as premised on a purely theoretical version of how courts operate.
In deciding whether the statute applied, it was proper to look to reality, for
that is what Congress does.
Blinking at reality is a central weakness of Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion. While Justice Stevens focuses on the link between elections and
83. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2366-67 (1991).
84. See generally DuBois, supra note 45, at 32-34 (describing these criticisms).
85. Hence the reference in Gregory to judges' "general lack of accountability." Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2407 (1991); see also supra note 60. The plaintiff judges in Gregory were
appointed (elected officials are expressly exempted from the ADEA's coverage) but subject to
recall elections. Rather than seeing recall elections as a tool of popular control, the Court stressed
that the elections came only every twelve years (six for some) and were usually meaningless be-
cause judges operate out of the public eye. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2407. Thus, while willing to say
that judges are policymakers the Court did not portray them as representatives in the sense of
being subject to popular control.
86. For confirmation from an elected state-court judge, see NEELY, supra note 45, at 1-4. See
also DuBois, supra note 45 (concluding that as an empirical matter, partisan elections best ensure
judicial accountability); Francis A. Allen, A Serendipitous Trek Through the Advance-Sheet Jun-
gle: Criminal Justice in the Courts of Review, 70 IOWA L. REV. 311, 315-16 (1985) (discussing
popular pressure on elected judges to be "tough on crime"); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S.
Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limi-
tations, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1301, 1358-59 & n.251 (concluding that state court judges have been
reluctant to enforce constitutional debt limitations in part because they are subject to the same
political pressures that cause legislators to ignore such limitations in the first place).
[Vol. 75:725
VERSIONS OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE
accountability, Justice Scalia latches on to a different aspect of the Chevron
model, namely the idea of an apolitical judiciary. For Justice Scalia, neither
an elected judge nor an appointed one is a popular representative: "[T]he
judge represents the Law-which often requires him to rule against the
People.""7 But his argument is not that elections do not actually have an
effect on judicial independence. He seems uninterested in whether they do;
it is enough that they are not supposed to. To complete the circle, he ac-
cuses the majority of violating this vision of the judicial function, wielding
the Voting Rights Act "as they please.""8 To Justice Scalia, the majority's
approach is anti-democratic in two ways. First, it involves "judicial inter-
ference in democratic elections." 9 Second, this free-form, policy-driven ap-
proach to statutory construction undercuts Congress's ability to execute the
popular will because it leaves Congress uncertain as to how its statutes will
be read.90 Judges are representatives, but their constituency is the elected
branches of government from which they take instructions, 91 or, more
broadly, "the Law." 92
The difference between the majority and the dissent at the abstract level
is minute. They share a theoretical commitment to an independent judici-
ary. Despite its holding, the majority stresses that "ideally public opinion
should be irrelevant to the judge's role," 93 and it plainly disapproves of
electing judges. The majority is unable to rely on "the ideal character of the
judicial office," however, given "the real world of electoral politics." 94 In
contrast, the dissent looks to the ideal. Here again, as in Gregory, the ma-
87. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2372 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. 1& at 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2375 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is a strange choice of words given Scalia's view of
the merits. What makes these elections "democratic" if they are not for the purpose of selecting
"representatives"?
90. This is a recurrent theme of Justice Scalia's. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,
344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Eskridge, supra note 58, at 677. It is unlikely that
his approach to statutory interpretation would do for democracy all he claims. See generally
Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential Collision
in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 175 (1992). Chisom is itself one of
many examples where Justice Scalia has hampered rather than enhanced Congress's effectuation
of the popular will.
91. Hence Larry Kramer's observation that "I cannot imagine Justice Scalia serving on a
common-law court. For the considerations of justice and policy that are central to common-law
adjudication-and that surely ought to remain a part of other forms of adjudication-are anath-
ema to Justice Scalia's vision of judging." Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1798 (1991).
92. Chisom, 11 S. Ct. at 2372 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "Law" with a capital "L" is
clearly something external, found rather than made.
93. Id. at 2366-67.
94. Id. at 2367.
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jority's approach is correct because it is more likely to be consistent with
Congress. Justice Scalia devotes much of his statutory discussion to the
need to focus on the ordinary meaning of the term representatives. One can
grant him his point, but it does not resolve the case. The hard question is
whether we look to judges as they are or as they are supposed to be. The
former fits within the "ordinary meaning" of the term, the latter does not.
Justice Scalia does not indicate why Congress would have directed the stat-
ute at an idealized, purely hypothetical judiciary.
Finally, the majority and the dissent might be reconciled to some degree
in a model of the representative as trustee, exercising independent judg-
ment, rather than as a delegate adhering to .a popular mandate. Such was
the original conception of elected federal officers. 95 Developing such a
model is precisely the goal of almost all efforts to explain away the counter-
majoritarian difficulty of judicial review, of advocates of "dynamic" statu-
tory interpretation,96 and of those scholars who prescribe a role for the
courts in correcting government's anti-democratic aspects.97 The trustee
model is not limited to elected judges. Just as elected officials are not neces-
sarily representatives, so representatives need not necessarily be elected. In-
deed, given Justice Stevens's positions in Gregory (that appointed judges
clearly are policymakers) and Chevron (that policy should be made by offi-
cials who are accountable to the public), one would expect him to be reas-
sured, not bothered, by the claim that judges have representative
obligations. Some notion of the judge as trustee is necessary to reconcile
these diverging tendencies.98 Within the judicial system, the jury is a rele-
95. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY 24-26 (1989); THE FEDERALIST
No. 71, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) (noting representative's duty to pur-
sue the people's "interests" over their "inclinations"); id., No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (placing
the advantage of representative over direct democracy in the former's tendency to "refine and
enlarge the public views"); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 38-48 (1985).
96. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479,
1523-33 (1987).
97. E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 49.
98. Had Justice Brennan still been on the Court for Chisom, he surely would have been in the
majority and might well have assigned the case to himself. One wonders whether he would have
developed the idea of representative judges as trustees. He implicitly offered such a view in a 1984
lecture. In interpreting the Constitution, he stated, the Justices "speak for their community," for
"it is, in a very real sense, the community's interpretation that is sought." Thus, judges are repre-
sentatives. On the other hand, in the same speech he acknowledged that most of his fellow-
citizens disagreed with his view that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. Thus, judges
are not delegates, bound by a popular mandate. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification, Speech (Oct. 12, 1985), in Construing the Constitution,
19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 4, 13 (1985); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., Lecture (Sept. 17, 1987),
in Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law" 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 23 (1988) (arguing
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vant though imperfect model of unelected representatives. The Court, quite
properly, views the jury as the public's representative. 99 Yet jurors are
unelected and unaccountable. They do not seek reappointment (indeed, for
a time service disqualifies); there is no popular review of their verdict, and
any effort to sway a jury in light of expected public reaction to a verdict is
forbidden.
B. Symbolism and Representativeness
"Representation" has two meanings in addition to the political one just
discussed. First, it can be purely symbolic, the way the flag represents cer-
tain values and institutions. Second, it can refer to typicality, as in the case
of a "representative" subgroup so like the larger group from which it is
drawn that its views and preferences will correspond with those of the
larger group. These aspects of representation merit a slight detour because
they took center stage with the nomination of Clarence Thomas and be-
cause they underscore the general acceptance of the descriptive model of
the judicial function.
Justice Thomas's central, although not only, qualifications for appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court were his skin color and his biography. Some
saw these as valuable because of the perspective they give him on legal is-
sues."° For the White House, however, the point was not who Clarence
Thomas represents but what he represents. As President Bush stated in
announcing the nomination, "Judge Thomas's life is a model for all Ameri-
cans, and he's earned the right to sit on this nation's highest court." 10' It
was as a "model," a symbol, that Judge Thomas had most distinguished
himself and "earned" a place on the Supreme Court. Comparison with the
previous year's packaging of Justice Souter drives the point home. The
President defended Justice Souter in the usual Republican manner, by con-
that "reliance on formal rules alone," untouched by passion, cannot satisfy the courts' constitu-
tional obligations to "our ultimate sovereign-the people.").
99. See, eg., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942) (describing representative jury
as part of "our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government"). Indeed,
a few months before deciding Chisom, the Court wrote:
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the
parties and insures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people.... Indeed, with
the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1369 (1992) (citations omitted) (striking down prosecutor's use
of race-based preemptory challenges).
100. See, e.g., Maya Angelou, I Dare to Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, § 4, at 15; Guido
Calabresi, Wat Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, § 4, at 15.
101. The Supreme Court: Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 1991, at A14.
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stantly returning to the theme that Souter would find the law rather than
make it."°2 Justice Souter's key credential was that he would not be a repre-
sentative policymaker in the political sense, and the mechanical task for
which he was qualified was one as to which "representativeness" was irrele-
vant. 10 3 This rhetoric was completely in the background in the case of Jus-
tice Thomas, obscured by his looming symbolic presence. Of course, as so
many have pointed out, Justice Thomas's nomination symbolizes not only
hard work and upward mobility, but also the triumph of the civil rights
laws, affirmative action, and, arguably, a quota system for Supreme Court
appointments.
The Thomas nomination was also a response to the complaint that the
judiciary is not adequately "representative" of society as a whole. Advo-
cates of a more representative bench"° often fail to identify precisely the
value of such diversity. Three overlapping justifications are implicit. First,
the bench, like any profession, should be open to all regardless of race or
gender. This justification is concerned with the benefit to those who be-
come judges, not the public at large. It is only coincidentally about repre-
sentativeness. Second, a "representative" judiciary (or Congress or school
board) has symbolic value. Those subject to the commands of a governing
body will have more confidence in and respect for that body if it includes a
member or members who are "like" them. 105 Third, representativeness will
affect substantive outcomes; that is the basic realist critique and the as-
sumption, or hope, underlying much reluctant support for the Thomas
102. See Comments by President on His Choice of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A18
(transcript of press conference); see also supra note 78.
103. As a symbol, Justice Souter had little to offer under the Republican value system. True,
he was fond of his mother, but in a solitary "confirmed bachelor" this was as much a liability as
an asset. Nor could he be said to "represent" some portion of a diverse citizenry. See Edith
Adame, How Could a Hermit from New Hampshire Possibly Understand Multicultural America,
L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 29, 1990, at 6. His reclusiveness was sold as an aspect of sound, unrepresent-
ative judicial temperament.
104. E.g., Nancy Levit, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason, 85 Nw. U.
L. REv. 494, 512-14 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990)).
105. Recalling the Carter administration's efforts to add women and minorities to the bench,
former Attorney General Griffin Bell stated that "[a]ffirmative action was designed solely to give
the American public more confidence in the federal courts." WHOM Do JUDGES REPRESENT? 5
(1981) (Am. Enterprise Inst. F. 53) (emphasis added). Similarly, the New York State Governor's
Task Force on Judicial Diversity-establishment of which was prompted by the Chisom deci-
sion-seeks to add minorities and women to the bench because "[w]e want to be sure that in both
appearance and reality everyone can see that the bench is above and not tainted by discrimination.
Right now, the numbers don't lead to that kind of confidence." Gary Spencer, Judicial Election
Reforms Urged, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at 1, 2 (quoting Evan A. Davis, chair of the Task
Force). This argument blends the first and second justifications.
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nomination. These latter two justifications are linked. It is because deci-
sions are affected by the decisionmaker's background and group member-
ship that "representativeness" has symbolic value. Public confidence in
governing bodies hinges much more on their representativeness than does
public confidence in, say, the space program. Thus, the reason "representa-
tiveness" matters with regard to judges is that they do act on behalf of the
public and they do so through the elaboration of norms that are not wholly
objective. It is not a pun to link judges as "representatives," as in Chisom,
and the "representativeness" of the judiciary. It is because they are the first
that the second matters. That is also why plaintiffs bring cases like Chisom
and one reason why the Voting Rights Act should apply to judicial elec-
tions. One striking aspect of the Chisom opinion is that it never even hints
at this. The whole point of the litigation, which was brought by a class of
135,000 African-American registered voters, was to put more minorities on
the bench. The proverbial Martian would have a hard time gleaning this
from the Court's opinion. The opinion is written within the parameters of
the usual normative view of judging, under which factors such as the race of
the judge do not matter.
Although the criteria of representativeness change, it has always been
accepted that the judiciary should be representative. Supreme Court ap-
pointments, for example, have always reflected a balance of religion, geog-
raphy, and background. Variety per se is not the inherent value, for there is
an implicit or explicit understanding as to which features should be diverse
and which consistent. Hence the general scorn for Senator Hruska's argu-
ment that G. Harrold Carswell should sit on the Court because "there are a
lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers" and "[t]hey are entitled to a
little representation, aren't they?" ' 6 Identifying the varieties of back-
ground and experience that are valuable in the judiciary reveals a good deal
about what we think judges do. The further afield one gets from legal expe-
106. ABRAHAM, supra note 78, at 16-17. Hruska's full defense was: "Even if he is mediocre
there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representa-
tion, aren't they, and a little chance. We can't have all Brandeises, Cardozos, and Frankfurters,
and stuff like that there." Id Perhaps unintentionally, Hruska's comment announced disdain for
how the idea of a "representative" Court had functioned in the past. Carswell was nominated to
replace Abe Fortas, who was the last holder of the Court's "Jewish seat." In historical context,
the most notable fact about Carswell, other than his mediocrity, was that he was not Jewish.
Hruska's list of non-mediocre Justices is astonishing in that it consists, in its entirety, of the three
best-known of the Court's five Jewish Justices. Thus, Hruska was saying, almost literally, that if
Jews are to have representation, so should the mediocre; indeed he was in a sense arguing for
eliminating the Jewish seat in favor of the mediocre seat. This gives a different flavor to the
observation that "we can't have all"-or any---"Brandeises, Cardozos, and Frankfurters, and stuff
like that."
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rience, the more it seems that judges make rather than find the law.' 7 But
whatever qualities should be represented, the very fact of any argument for
variety of background indicates an understanding that the law is not found
in a Blackstonian sense but is inescapably fluid and in a process of judicial
creation. Arguments about judicial representativeness rest on the realist
conclusion that judges are representatives.
C. Mandatory Retirement and Representativeness
This brings us back to the opinions in Chisom and Gregory. A standard
justification for mandatory retirement of judges has been that it opens up
positions for women and minorities, thus enabling states to make their judi-
ciaries more representative. This is hardly a timeless justification. It may
hold at this particular historical moment, when the bench is still predomi-
nantly male and white, but there is some movement to appoint women and
minorities. However, once the new appointees are on the bench, mandatory
retirement will prevent them from staying there, and there is no guarantee
as to who their replacements will be.'0° Furthermore, requiring judges to
step down at seventy will hardly make or break a shift to a more diverse
107. A recent debate over the appointment process for Supreme Court Justices illustrates
exactly this point. David Strauss and Cass Sunstein have proposed that the Senate play a much
more central role than has recently been the case, giving no deference to the President's selection
and insisting on a real, pre-nomination advice function. David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491 (1992). Part of their
project is to produce a Court that comprises justices of diverse jurisprudential views. Id. at 1510-
12. The call for intellectual diversity of course assumes that the judge's task is to some degree
discretionary and requiring "judgment."
John McGinnis has forcefully responded to Strauss and Sunstein. John 0. McGinnis, The
President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss
and Sunstein, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 633 (1993). For McGinnis, the President has a constitutional
obligation to propose nominees who share the President's jurisprudential views; if this leads to an
intellectually homogenous Court, that is if anything a strength.
It may be the highest commendation for a legislature that it represents the diverse views of
the citizenry and thereby serves as a vehicle for democratic compromise. Under the tradi-
tional view that the law is distinct from politics, it is hardly the highest commendation,
however, that a court is representative. Indeed, in a structure with constitutional judicial
review, one of the essential tasks of the Court is to enforce constitutional provisions against
the will of a representative legislature.
Id. at 651 (footnote omitted).
Whether Strauss and Sunstein or McGinnis correctly reads the Appointments Clause is not
relevant for present purposes. The point is only that these divergent views on diversity within the
Court reflect quite different views about what it is judges do.
108. This point has a parallel in debates over stare decisis, in which the same built-in tension
appears. To those seeking doctrinal change, "retiring" old precedents may be appealing. Yet this
disregard for precedent will ultimately undermine the very changes it permits. See David A.
Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1699, 1715-16 (1991).
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judiciary. The average male life span is not much more than seventy and
many judges voluntarily retire before or around seventy. Nonetheless,
lower courts upholding the legality of mandatory retirement for judges have
often referred to this justification."°o The courts have also invoked a sec-
ond, related notion of representativeness. Mandatory retirement is said to
ensure that the judiciary will not become fossilized; the resulting turnover
will give us "judges who command respect because they share experiences
and understandings similar to those of the majority of adult citizens."1UO
The goals of diversity and currency are conspicuously absent from the
Gregory Court's discussion of the statute's rationality under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Given the opportunity to develop an idea of a judiciary that
is representative and in tune with the times, the Court carefully avoids it.
This is not surprising, for the idea that mandatory retirement will prevent
an anachronistic judiciary reinforces the idea of judges as policymakers. It
is because judges are policymakers that they need to be in touch. It is be-
cause the law is not external, constant, and found that those who have been
on the bench the longest are not necessarily the best equipped to judge.
Similarly, the Chisom Court at no point indicates that a more representative
set of judicial representatives might be valuable; if anything, its hostility to
elected judges implies the opposite."'
109. E.g., EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (lst Cir. 1988); Apkin v. Treasurer and
Receiver Gen., 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1988).
110. Apkin, 517 N.E.2d at 146 (1988); see also O'Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Mo.
1978) (en banc).
111. One other case from the 1990 Term required the Court to decide what defines a "court."
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991), was a challenge to appoint-
ments of special trial judges by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court. All nine Justices agreed that
special trial judges are "inferior officers" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 2641.
Thus, they can be appointed only by the President with the Senate's advice and consent, the
President alone, "the Courts of Law, or the Heads of Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. The first two categories obviously did not apply. Five Justices found that the Tax Court is a
"court of law" and four upheld the arrangement on the ground that the Chief Judge head a
"department."
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion has a familiar ring: What makes the Tax Court a court?
"It is neither advocate nor rulemaker. As an adjudicatory body, it construes statutes ... and
regulations .... It does not make political decisions." Freytag, 111 S. Ct. at 2645. Thus, Justice
Blackmun measures the Tax Court by the standard normative vision of courts. The case was easy
because there was no need to confront the competing descriptive version. The concurring Justices
disagreed not over the nature of courts but over the meaning of the Appointments Clause. Justice
Scalia acknowledged that the Tax Court was a court. However, he argued that, like the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, for example, it was not one of "the Courts of Law" referred to by the
Appointments Clause.
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V. JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
The Justices' normative model of courts is not applicable to all adjudica-
tors. Administrative agencies regularly make policy through adjudica-
tion.112 Presumably, the Court would say that this is appropriate because,
as Chevron explained, agencies enjoy the legitimacy that comes from (indi-
rect) electoral accountability. Policymaking via agency adjudication has
certain characteristics that are not part of the conventional picture of judi-
cial decisionmaking. Three stand out: Frequent shifts of policy, decisions
that are often prospective, and a docket that reflects the perceived need for
action. Not coincidentally, these characteristics are even more prominent
in the archetypal representative policymaker, the legislature. In contrast,
under the conventional view courts are bound by stare decisis, their deci-
sions are retroactive, and they merely resolve those disputes that happen to
come to them.
In this Part, I discuss these aspects of the mechanics of judicial decision-
making. If Chisom and Gregory suggest, although ambivalently, a view of
courts as representative policymakers with regard to the inputs or bases of
their decisions, Payne v. Tennessee'13 and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia114 suggest such a view with regard to these mechanics. We again
see the tug of the normative model, its ultimate rejection, and formalist
objections to the outcome.
A. Stare Decisis
In theory, courts respect their own precedents. The doctrine of stare
decisis tends to be honored, however, primarily in the breach. The gap
between theory and practice was evident in Payne. Overruling Booth v.
Maryland' and South Carolina v. Gathers,"6 four and two years old re-
spectively, Payne held that the Constitution permits the prosecution in a
capital case to introduce evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim's
survivors.
As I have discussed, Gregory's Tenth Amendment rhapsody had unac-
knowledged implications for the issue on the merits in that case" 7 and in
Chisom." 8 It also holds a lesson with regard to the weight of precedent, an
112. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
113. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
114. 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
115. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
116. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
117. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
118. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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issue confronting the Court in Payne. That lesson comes from the Court's
pendular treatment of the Tenth Amendment in the past. In Maryland v.
Wirtz,1 19 the Court upheld congressional regulation of state employees;
eight years later, in National League of Cities v. Usery,120 it reversed itself
and held that the Tenth Amendment forbids Congress to interfere with the
states' performance of traditional governmental functions; nine years after
that, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 2 ' it re-re-
versed itself over dissents promising that National League of Cities would
rise again.122 Read against this background, Justice O'Connor's Tenth
Amendment discussion in Gregory was not so much necessary for the deci-
sion of the case as it was an announcement that the foretold overruling of
Garcia is imminent.1 23 That, in turn, indicates that the claims of stare deci-
sis are weak-which this sequence of decisions had already quite amply
demonstrated.
The view of precedent implicit in Gregory is explicit in Payne. Con-
fronted with recent and dispositive precedents, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court offers the standard view that precedent is less binding
in constitutional cases than in statutory cases and the more controversial
claim that it is less important in "cases such as the present one involving
procedural and evidentiary rules" than in cases "involving property and
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved." '124 Since Booth and
Gathers were 5-4 decisions, over "spirited dissents," which had proven diffi-
cult to apply, this watered-down stare decisis did not stand in the way of
overruling them.1 25 Concurring, Justice Scalia quoted some of Justice Mar-
shall's older statements about the non-binding nature of precedent and ar-
gued, as is implicit in any overruling decision involving a constitutional
issue, that the overruled cases were the real aberrations and that Payne was
a return to settled principles.1 26 Of the Justices in the majority, Justice Sou-
ter seemed to feel the pull of precedent most strongly. However, he con-
119. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
120. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
121. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
122. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. In what many thought would be the vehicle for doing so, however, the Court further
invigorated the Tenth Amendment but stopped shy of overruling Garcia, at least explicitly. See
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
124. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (1991).
125. Id. at 2610-11.
126. Id. at 2613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cluded that the necessary "special justification" for overruling was present
because Booth and Gathers had proved unworkable in practice. 127
Justice Marshall's dissent, his final opinion as a Supreme Court Justice,
is a thunderous, perhaps bombastic, defense of stare decisis. From its strik-
ing, though overstated, opening soundbite--"Power, not reason, is the new
currency of this Court's decisionmaking" 12 -- the dissent, which was joined
by Justice Blackmun and more or less endorsed by Justice Stevens,129 is a
rhetorically unrestrained attack on the majority's methodology. Justice
Marshall argued that stare decisis serves important purposes in promoting
reliance, encouraging compliance by the public and by other courts, and in
protecting the politically unpopular. Repeatedly stating that nothing had
changed since Booth and Gathers other than the Court's personnel, he
stressed that adherence to precedent demonstrates that the Court is con-
strained by law and not merely following its own predilections. 30
1. Payne, Stare Decisis, and Law Finding
Many Justices have identified a link between stare decisis and con-
straints on judicial policymaking. Consider Justice Powell:
Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis
is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the pub-
lic, and by the other branches of government, rests in large part on
the knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected judges
free to write their policy views into law. Rather, the Court is a body
vested with the duty to exercise the judicial power prescribed by the
Constitution. An important aspect of this is the respect the Court
shows for its own previous opinion.1 31
127. Id. at 2614-19 (Souter, J., concurring). The "special justification" standard from Ari-
zona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984), is invoked by Justice Marshall as well. Payne, I11 S.
Ct. at 2621-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The criticism is familiar. See supra
note 39; see also Guido Calabresi, Tom Emerson: The Scholar as Hero, 101 YALE L.J. 315, 316
(1991) (bemoaning "a Supreme Court that, in its eagerness to execute those whom it deems guilty,
cares little for precedent, logic, or human decency") (emphasis in original).
129. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2625 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2618, 2623-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Solario v. United States, 483 U.S.
435, 466 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 44 RECORD ASS'N BAR 813,
819 (1989); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-15 (1992) (joint opinion
of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (noting that "[t]he Court's power lies in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception" that could fade if too "frequent overriding... overtax[ed]
the country's belief in the Court's good faith" and was "taken as evidence that justifiable reexami-
nation of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term"); Vazquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stare decisis "permits society to presume that bedrock princi-
ples are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals"); Florida Dep't of Health
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To be sure, this may merely be one part myth and two parts public rela-
tions. Justices making this point invariably express concern not with how
the Court actually decides cases but with how it is popularly perceived to
do so, which may indicate that they deem the perception accurate (at least
descriptively) but dangerous.132 Moreover, a law-finding judge would ap-
propriately overrule precedent on the ground that the prior court had im-
properly made law. Indeed, that is the standard formulation.133 The
primary guardians of the guardians, after all, are their successors. Any sub-
stantive theory of proper decisionmaking must allow for overruling, for the
very existence of the theory means that some decisions may be wrong. If
the substantive theory is that judges should not impose their own policy
preferences, then overruling a decision in which a prior court did so is con-
sistent with the overall approach.
Nonetheless, a link does exist between policymaking and freedom from
precedent. The link can be seen in the way judges treat flip-flopping agency
"interpretations" of statutes. Traditionally, such shifts by the agency un-
dermined the deference accorded by a court."3 This approach only makes
sense if the agency is finding the law embedded in the statute. If there is
nothing to find, and the agency's "interpretations" are simply policy deci-
sions with no "right" answer under the statute, however, then there is no
reason to be suspicious about a change; to the contrary, it may reflect just
the responsiveness we value in agencies.13 Ignoring precedent is also a typ-
ical and appropriate characteristic of legislatures. Adherence to precedent
impedes responsiveness, which is precisely why such adherence is a good
thing for courts and a bad thing for legislatures. Rejection of precedent
may frequently reflect responsiveness or, in the words of the Casey joint
& Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 151-55 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (Harlan, J.); United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); ARTHUR GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE:
THE WARREN COURT ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 75-76 (1971); John Paul Stevens, The Life
Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2, 5 (1983).
132. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 152-55 (1986) (discussing "as-if rights" and
pragmatist's "noble lie" that decisions rest on statute or precedent); cf William 0. Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 754 (1949) (rejecting argument that public confidence in the
Court depends on perception of doctrinal stability and arguing that frank overruling will breed
understanding "[a]nd confidence based on understanding is more enduring than confidence based
on awe").
133. EDWARD J. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 7-8 (1949).
134. E.g., EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 600 n.17 (1981).
135. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty
Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1125-26 (1987).
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opinion, "political pressure."1 36 For a judge who sees her role as promul-
gating correct social policy, precedent is a hindrance. 37 The notion that
the overruling court is simply "finding" the true law where it had been all
along is likely to be merely a "magnificent disguise,"13 8 and will quickly
ring hollow if too often invoked. If judges do find law, one obvious place to
look is in their own past decisions. 139 Overall, then, the more freely courts
overrule their own precedents the more they are just making it up."4°
The majority and concurring opinions in Payne are conspicuously silent
about the link between stare decisis and law-finding. The Court discusses
only the other prominent justification for stare decisis, namely, protection
of settled expectations. ' The Court looks at stare decisis exactly as a legis-
lature does, deeming itself free to change as long as doing so is not too
disruptive. Only the dissent argues that the law exists independent of the
current preferences of a majority of the Justices, objecting to the majority's
disregard for "the law of the land."'142 Justice Scalia virtually comes right
out and rejects this line of argument as empty formalism. 143 The Court's
casual dismissal of the claims of precedent implicitly rejects the ideal for the
real, and suggests that the court is more policymaker than lawfinder.14
136. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
137. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 741 n. 108 (1988) ("stare decisis is undercut by law teachers and their deep-rooted belief
that lawyers are social engineers").
138. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. Rnv. 1365, 1378-79 (1990).
139. Stevens, supra note 131, at 5. Thus Justice Scalia has explicitly equated overruling with
lawmaking, observing that disincentives to overruling are important "checks upon judicial law
making." James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991).
140. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 70-71 (1991); Monaghan, supra note 137, at 753 (arguing
that adherence to precedent will minimize "the existing cynicism that constitutional law is noth-
ing more than politics carried on in a different forum").
141. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
142. Id. at 2621, 2623 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]hat would enshrine power as the governing
principle of this Court is the notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly inade-
quate rational support must be left in place for the sole reason that it once attracted five votes.")
(emphasis in original).
144. The Court's treatment of stare decisis shows that the Court is a policymaker in a second
sense as well. Stare decisis has always been deemed "a principle of policy." Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). Indeed, an amicus brief in Gregory pointed to the courts' balancing of
competing considerations in deciding whether to overrule as proof that judges are policymakers
and therefore exempt from the ADEA. Payne is typical in that it implicitly denies any constitu-
tional limit on overruling and weighs, balances, and argues about consequences.
Policy concerns are, by definition, prominent here. Stare decisis has no meaning if it merely
requires a court to follow precedent unless it disagrees with it. A prior decision's inaccuracy
cannot alone justify overruling. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172
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Ironically, the Court relies on precedent to show that it has the author-
ity to abandon precedent. 45 It does so precisely to show that it is operating
as courts are supposed to and not just making things up as it goes along.
Other judges have overruled decisions in the past; we are adhering to the
law of stare decisis which we find in our own precedent. The Court nods
toward the normative ideal of consistency, even while destroying that ideal
in its ruling on the merits. By its opinion-writing style, the Court confirms
that stare decisis preserves the appearance or reality of judges doing some-
thing other than merely following their own predilections. Yet one is not
convinced. The majority does not appear to be constrained by precedent.
For every decision that respects a prior ruling there is a decision that ig-
nores one. The contrast between the majority opinion and Justice Souter's
concurring opinion is that Justice Souter at least gives the impression of
honestly grappling with the Court's precedent about precedent. There is, in
short, no coherent doctrine of stare decisis to be drawn from prior cases.
The prior cases thus become not a requirement but an excuse. This is, of
course, hardly the only body of law for which this is true. It is a common
observation, and only a slight exaggeration, that given the maturity of our
legal system, the number of courts, and the existence of computerized data
bases, a precedent can always be found.
Payne identifies the Court as a representative policymaker in two other
ways that merit brief mention. First, the decision resulted from a series of
appointments by Republican Presidents. The predecessors of Justices Ken-
nedy and Souter had been in the Booth and Gathers majorities. At the theo-
retical level, doctrinal transformation through changes in personnel is
justifiable only if the Justices are supposed to "represent" the popular will
as implemented through Presidential appointment. All three Chisom dis-
senters, who denied that judges represent the people, were in the majority in
Payne, in which they did just that. Chief Justice Rehnquist has described
the appointment process as a mechanism for "indirect infusions of the pop-
(1989); Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 S. Cr. REv. 227, 231-32. Under the
principle of stare decisis, the Court will allow its legal errors to stand unless policy considera-
tions-the "special justification" of impracticality or unworkability-require abandoning them.
Stare decisis is thus exactly the opposite of the usual conception of judicial decisionmaking, under
which courts are bound to follow the law, even if it is inconvenient or silly. Instead, courts ignore
the law, unless doing so is inconvenient or silly. The legal mandate is soft, the policy considera-
tions hard.
The doctrine of stare decisis is in this sense at odds with the Court's conception of a non-
policymaking judiciary. In this setting, however, the Court is making policy only for itself. That
does not make it a policymaker in its governmental capacity. See supra note 43.
145. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609-10; id at 2617-19 (Souter, J., concurring).
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ular will."' 4 6 The recent history of the judicial nomination and confirma-
tion process only confirms this view. Qualification for the judiciary is
evaluated almost solely in terms of the political desirability of the nominee's
anticipated votes.' 47 In Payne, the Court rose, or fell, to these expectations.
Indeed, some commentators have expressed concern that treating judges as
mere politicians in robes, both during confirmation battles and once on the
bench, will be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 4 ' Payne was one of several cases
from the 1990 Term in which the new Justices might be said to be deliver-
ing the goods, as promised. 14
9
The second way in which Payne reveals the Court as a representative
policymaker is that the opinions give a strong sense that the Justices in the
majority felt they were not only setting matters right when they had been
askew, but also that they were reconciling constitutional doctrine with pop-
ular sentiment.' s0 This reconciliation is easily overstated, because Eighth
146. William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2 CONST.
COMM. 319, 320, 330 (1985). This article is reprinted essentially unchanged as chapter 10 of
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS How rr Is (1987). Justice Scalia
too seemed to endorse this theory of public influence on the judiciary when lamenting the Court's
failure to give it its full effect in Gathers. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Ely, supra note 21, at 842-54.
148. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 838-39, 854-55. On one account of the history of
Supreme Court nominations, highly politicized, ideologically based confirmation battles have had
the effect of making the Court, in perception and reality, a more political institution. Richard D.
Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From Recon-
struction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 84-87 (1983).
149. See generally Green, supra note 19.
150. Justice Rehnquist observed that theories of sentencing "have varied with the times," that
the "pendulum has swung back" toward more determinate sentencing, and that "in recent years
.. consideration of the harm caused by the crime has been an important factor in the exercise of"
judicial discretion in sentencing. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2605-06 (1991). Justice
O'Connor pointed out that "there is no strong societal consensus that a jury may not take into
account the loss suffered by a victim's family . . . . Just the opposite is true." Id. at 2612
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that "Booth's stunning ipse dixit ... conflicts
with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a nationwide 'victim rights'
movement." Id. at 2613 (Scalia, J., concurring). To be fair, Justice Scalia's invocation of the
"public sense of justice," read in context, is not a full-fledged endorsement of that as the standard
by which prior constitutional decisions are to be evaluated. The phrase is borrowed from an
opinion by Justice Marshall which in turn quoted a law review article. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Peter L. Szanton, Stare Decisis: A
Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 394, 397 (1959)).
The "nationwide 'victim rights' movement," to which Justice Scalia referred, figured promi-
nently in one of the rare judicial elections of real salience: The 1986 retention election in which
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Bird and Associate Justices Grodin and Reynoso were
defeated. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 178-79 (1989). This is probably the political force with the greatest potential to
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Amendment cases always involve some reference to popular standards as a
measure of what is "cruel and unusual." ' Yet the usual rhetoric can make
its way into Eighth Amendment decisions, 5 2 and is missing here. Indeed,
Justice Stevens's dissenting accusation was that the majority was acting too
much like elected representatives, caving in to the "hydraulic pressure" of
public opinion.15
3
2. Stare Decisis and Leaving Policymaking to Others
Although a weak rule of stare decisis is inconsistent with the under-
standing of how judges theoretically operate, it may, at least in settings such
as Payne, owe a good deal to the Court's theory of leaving policymaking to
others. To the extent that this is true, Payne does not contradict the
Court's normative vision.
Stare decisis is usually understood to be weightier in statutory than in
constitutional cases because in the former the Court need not correct itself;
Congress will correct the Court's errors and congressional inaction indi-
cates that the decision is correct. The Payne opinion repeats this observa-
tion, with the customary cite to Justice Brandeis.15 4 This approach also
corresponds with the deferential ideal; the Court yields to Congress's pri-
mary role. If this principle is valid, 5 it might not only distinguish statu-
tory from constitutional precedents, but may distinguish between
affect judicial decisionmaking. See Allen, supra note 86. It is at least plausible to argue that in
California in 1986, the retention election served its supposed function of ensuring judicial account-
ability. Payne implies a vision of appointed federal judges as responsive, notwithstanding the
absence of the mechanism of accountability.
151. E.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
152. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378-80 (1989) (plurality opinion) (to hold
capital punishment of juveniles unconstitutional would be to follow "our personal preferences"
and "replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings").
153. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Justice Stevens's citation of
Holmes's Northern Securities dissent is loaded. That dissent is one of the standard examples of a
Justice disappointing the President who appointed him. ELDER WIT, CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 686 (2d ed. 1990). It was the opinion that
prompted Theodore Roosevelt to complain that he could carve a judge with more backbone out of
a banana. Id. Stevens's reference implicitly accuses the more recent appointees of being too
dependable.
154. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2610 (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
155. It may not be. It is routinely objected that congressional silence means nothing because
it has many causes other than agreement. See, e.g., Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpreta-
tion Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 663, 682 (1987). That is only
an argument against making statutory precedents absolutely binding, however. As long as statu-
tory change is easier than constitutional amendment, statutory precedents deserve relatively
greater weight. In any event, there are other arguments besides implicit congressional endorse-
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constitutional precedents. As Professor Monaghan has pointed out, consti-
tutional decisions that reject rights-based arguments can be "overruled" by
statute.1 6 After Payne, Tennessee's legislature is free to forbid introduction
of victim impact evidence; its prosecutors are free to forgo its use. Thus,
the Court's decision can be ignored in a way that it could not have been had
it come out the other way. If the distinction is important, then decisions
that limit legislative authority (usually by expanding individual rights) will
always be subject to judicial revision; those that defer to legislative author-
ity will carry greater force. Such a modification to the usual rule supports
the Court's result in Payne and suggests that Payne itself, unlike the deci-
sions it overruled, should have the weight of a statutory precedent. If there
is error in Payne, state legislatures are free to correct it by outlawing the
introduction of victim-impact statement evidence in capital cases.
Such a distinction between the precedential weight of different types of
constitutional decisions is lurking in Justice Scalia's opinion. In an ex-
traordinary, though confusing statement, he asserts that "to the extent
[stare decisis] rests upon anything more than administrative convenience,
[it] is merely the application to judicial precedents of a more general princi-
ple that the settled practices and expectations of a democratic society
should generally not be disturbed by the courts."' 57 In part, this is just
more of Justice Scalia the arch-traditionalist, to whom nothing is more vex-
ing than rocking the boat.' But this is also Justice Scalia the advocate of
judicial restraint, deferring to the legislative process. That is, the justifica-
tion for respecting settled practices is that they are the expressions of a
democratic society. This may be the first time that Justice Scalia has of-
fered a theoretical justification for the central position of tradition: It is a
democratic and majoritarian product. This idea helps reconcile Justice
Scalia's claimed devotion to tradition with his willingness to overrule. His
willingness to overrule always arises in settings where legislatures would
then be free to "overrule" the Court in turn.'5 9
Apart from the empirical dubiousness of the proposition that traditions
are in their nature democratic, the core flaw of this approach is that it over-
ment for strict stare decisis in statutory cases. Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It" The
Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177 (1989).
156. Monoghan, supra note 137, at 742 & n.112.
157. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2613-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. See generally Strauss, supra note 108.
159. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 531 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing for overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court
should abandon the notion of dormant commerce clause limits on state authority).
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looks the Court's function as the protector of political minorities. Of
course, a legislature could overrule Payne, but it is highly unlikely that one
will. Legislatures tend not to enact statutes aimed at protecting a despised
minority of political outsiders from the venomous anger of an outraged ma-
jority.1" In a very real sense, Payne is thus not subject to legislative rever-
sal. The reason for this immunity, however, is that the decision allows the
political process have its way. Therefore, it is probably consistent with ac-
tual majority sentiment in the country, and will directly harm only a small
minority of the population.
The claim that respect for stare decisis is consistent with a view of
judges as finders of the law is thus oversimplified. The Rehnquist majority
could have its cake and eat it too, because the substantive doctrine it pur-
sues is one of accepting the decisions of legislative majorities. Payne could
reflect a theory of weak stare decisis that denies that judges make law or
policy in that it gives weight only to the precedents that the legislature can
overrule. Such a theory would be a mistake, and would come at the ex-
pense of the basic function of the courts to protect against majoritarian
tyranny. Nonetheless it is internally coherent.
B. Setting a Policy Agenda
A legislature sets its own agenda, pursuing (or, according to some crit-
ics, avoiding) the most pressing issues-so does the Supreme Court. The
docket is discretionary, sufficiently crowded and varied to allow the Court
to take on almost any issue it wishes, and filled according to which issues,
not which cases, require resolution."'
Payne illustrates the legislative aspect of the Court in its most extreme
and active form. Although the decision may have been virtuous, it was
hardly passive.162 On the term's opening day, the Court granted certiorari
in Ohio v. Huertas,163 which raised the victim-impact evidence issue. How-
ever, it ultimately dismissed Huertas as improvidently granted." € Undeter-
red, it promptly granted certiorari in Payne v. Tennessee.165 By now,
160. See Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting certain popular approval
for majority's decision).
161. See Sup. Cr. R. 10.1.
162. Cf ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH ch. 4 (1962).
163. Ill S. Ct. 39 (1991) (granting certiorari).
164. Ohio v. Huertas, 111 S. Ct. 805 (1991). The Court initially denied respondent's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the decision below rested on an independent and adequate state
ground. 111 S. Ct. 383 (1990). After argument, that ground apparently proved too conspicuous
to be ignored.
165. Ill S. Ct. 1031 (1991); 111 S. Ct. 1407 (1991).
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however, the last argument day was only a little more than two months off.
The normal briefing schedule would force the case into the next term. With
no time to lose, the Court issued its order on a Friday, rather than waiting
until the following Tuesday, as is customary, and established an expedited
briefing schedule so that the case would be heard during the 1990 Term. 66
It also specifically requested the parties to address the question whether to
overrule Booth and Gathers, a question that the petition, for obvious rea-
sons, had not raised. 6 7 On February 19 the Court amended its order, limit-
ing the grant to the second of the three questions raised by the petition. 6
The limited grant would force a decision on admissibility of the victim im-
pact statement and avoid any possibility that the Court or some of its mem-
bers would be sidetracked from the matter at hand. At this point, then, "no
knowledgeable observer could doubt that the days of [Booth and Gathers]
were numbered. 16 9 The Court was, to quote one commentator, "hell-bent
to allow victim impact testimony."' 70  So much for the theory that the
Court's policymaking opportunities are limited by the need to wait for cases
to come to it. The history of Payne belies the image of the Court as merely
resolving disputes. Here the Court was acting with a sense of its norm-
elaborating function as keen as anything that, say, Owen Fiss could ever
have conceived.' 7'
166. 59 U.S.L.W. 3558 (Feb. 15, 1991) (No. 90-5721). The petitioner was given 31 days to
file its brief; the respondent's brief was due 21 days later. The case was heard on the term's last
day of argument.
167. This procedure provoked the three Justices who ultimately dissented on the merits to
take the unusual step of dissenting from the grant of certiorari. In a brief opinion by Justice
Stevens, the dissenters argued that requiring briefing on the overruling question, which neither
party had suggested, was "both unwise and unnecessary," and that the decisions below rested
alternatively on the ground that any Booth violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Payne, Ill S. Ct. at 1031 (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from
grant of certiorari).
168. 111 S. Ct. 1407 (1991).
169. Vivian Berger, Payne and Suffering-A Personal Reflection and A Victim-Centered Cri-
tique, 20 FLORIDA STATE U. L. REV. 21, 41-42 (1992). Berger vividly describes the Court's
aggressiveness in seeking out the case: "Four weeks [after dismissing Huertas as improvidently
granted], the Court again agreed to hear a capital case raising issues under Booth and Gathers.
Indeed, the Court reached out to do so. Fishing in the certiorari pool, the justices hooked a
petition from hell." Id. at 40.
170. Tony Mauro, Justices Just Say No: High Court Hell-bent to Allow Victim-Impact Testi-
mony, MANHATTAN LAW., Apr. 1991, at 14.
171. Fiss, among many others, has argued that the courts generally, and the Supreme Court
deciding constitutional cases in particular, serve a more important function in elaborating norms
than in deciding individual disputes. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Fore-
word: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a
Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 281-92 (1990).
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C. Prospectivity
The tension between theory and practice recurred in James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, in which the Court held that its decision in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias172 applied retroactively. 73  Three Justices,
finding selective prospectivity unfair, concluded that because the Court had
applied Bacchus to the parties in that case, the decision must be retroactive
across the board.174 Three argued that Article III requires all judicial deci-
sions to be retroactive.17 Three would have applied Bacchus prospectively
only. 176
Judicial decisions are usually retroactive. That is inherent in a legal
system that relies on precedent and on extrajudicial sources of law. When
retroactive application of a new rule has struck the Court as too disruptive
or unfair, however, it has simply applied it prospectively. The Court has
always treated retroactivity, like stare decisis, as a question of "policy"
rather than "law." Although the formulations for criminal and civil cases
have varied in their particulars, both involve an explicit balancing of the
real world pros and cons of retroactive application, free of constitutional
constraint. 177 Retroactivity doctrine is not much altered by Jim Beam.
Four Justices endorsed the standard precedent, Chevron Oil.17 Justice Sou-
ter, joined by Justice Stevens, expressed some reservations about prospec-
tive decisionmaking but went no further than rejecting selective
prospectivity on general principles of fairness. The provocative position
172. 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (striking down state alcohol sales tax that exempted liqueur made
from indigenous shrub as unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce).
173. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2445-46 (1991).
174. Id. at 2445-46 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, J.); id. at 2448 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 2449-50 (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall and Scalia, JJ., concurring); id. at
2450-51 (Scalia, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
176. Id. at 2451-56 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. In deciding whether to apply a new rule retroactively in a civil case, the Court will "look
[ to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard its operation" and "weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive
application." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971).
Until fairly recently the Court took a similar approach in criminal procedure cases. See, eg.,
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). It now applies new rules retroactively to all cases
pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), but not to habeas cases,
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Although these
decisions reject the case-by-case approach, their reasoning reflects the same understanding of the
inquiry as being one of pure policy and the weighing of competing factors. This is, indeed, a
telling criticism of Teague and Penry, since technically they are interpretations of the federal
habeas statute.
178. Jim Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2452 (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., dissenting); see supra note 177.
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was taken by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia, who argued that
Article III forbids prospectivity.
The dispute between the Marshall group and the rest of the Court is, on
two levels, quite literally a debate about whether judges are policymakers.
First, they disagree as to whether their decisions should be, like a legisla-
ture's, prospective, and second they disagree as to whether the answer to
that question lies in "law" or "policy." With regard to the first, as Justice
Souter stated, retroactivity "reflect[s] the declaratory theory of the law ac-
cording to which the courts are understood only to find the law, not to
make it.' 1 79 Retroactivity asserts that the law predates the decision; if that
is so, then the Justices cannot be making it up. In accepting prospective
rulings, six Justices reject this formal, theoretical model of decisionmaking.
The same dynamic surfaces in the Justices' discussion of the links be-
tween stare decisis and prospectivity. Arguing for prospectivity, and
sounding like a committed functionalist, Justice O'Connor asserts that not
applying a law-changing decision retroactively shows respect for stare deci-
sis because it respects settled expectations just as stare decisis is supposed
to.'80 As she had stated the term before: "Prospective overruling allows
courts to respect the principle of stare decisis even when they are impelled
to change the law in light of new understanding."' 81 This is the narrow
understanding that stare decisis does no more than preserve stability and
reliance.' 82 Five Justices-Souter, with Stevens, and the odd bedfellows of
179. Jim Beam, III S. Ct. at 2443. The link is also acknowledged by Justices White, id. at
2449 (White, J., concurring), and Scalia. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted that while he was "not so
naive... as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make law,' . . . they make it as judges make
it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it." Id. at 2451 (emphasis in original). For Justice
Scalia, this is a retreat from a more anachronistically literal view of judges finding law. See Amer-
ican Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 200 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). The shift is
from denying any inconsistency between the normative and the descriptive to acknowledging the
inconsistency but insisting that what counts is the theory, not the practice.
180. Jim Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2452.
181. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 496 U.S. at 197 (O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor's use
of the term "impel" is odd. One might say that the stimulus that "impels" is internal, whereas
that which "compels" is external. "Impel" suggests a conception of the judicial role as making
rather than finding law, of looking inward rather than outward. Something of the same attitude
surfaces in her opinion in Jim Beam, which refers, almost cavalierly, to "the Court decid[ing] ...
to change the law," and notes that "when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it."
Jim Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The phrasing has a strikingly legislative
ring.
182. Prospective overruling and stare decisis share a more abstract link. A prospective deci-
sion assumes a system of precedent; unlike a retroactive decision, it is meaningful precisely and
only because future courts will adhere to it. On the forward-looking aspects of precedent, see
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987); cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2815 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (describing stare
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Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia-make the opposite argument: The availa-
bility of prospective decisions undercuts stare decisis, inviting overruling by
reducing its consequences. They assume that overruling is a bad thing, but
do not say why. If it is only because it disrupts reliance interests, then
Justice O'Connor is correct that prospective overruling goes far toward
eliminating those concerns. These Justices imply that stare decisis has some
other value. That value would seem to be the belief that it keeps judges
from imposing their own policies.
With regard to how the Court should approach the question of prospec-
tivity, one set of Justices contends that it is a pure policy question left to the
Court; the other that it is a legal question determined by a binding external
source, the Constitution. Without discussing the merits, '83 I will make a
few comments about the effort to constitutionalize retroactivity.
First, the argument from Article III is to some extent required by the
fact that the dissenters' approach would mean overruling a long line of
cases. Overruling always requires returning to some truer, more fundamen-
tal understanding. Of course, this is another example-not that one was
needed-that the invocation of the "true" law is likely to be fictional.184
Second, the appeal to the Constitution is substantively significant be-
cause it implies a view of judges as having their hands tied, and by a bright-
line rule whose application involves no policy considerations, discretion, or
judgment. Some have suggested that Justice Scalia, at least, resorts to the
fiction of a law-finding judiciary simply to escape hard problems. 185
Although there may be something to this analysis, it is incomplete. Justice
Scalia does not latch on to just any available fiction to avoid hard questions,
he adopts one that illustrates his normative view of how courts should oper-
ate. The choice is thus not simply between the real and the fictional, in
which case it is hard to justify hiding from reality, but between the descrip-
tive and the normative, in which case there may be some value in insisting
on the latter because it will actually affect how judges make decisions.
decisis as involving a "promise of constancy" by which "the Court implicitly undertakes to re-
main steadfast").
183. The argument that Article III requires retroactive decisionmaking is convincingly re-
futed in Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. R v. 1733, 1797-1806 (1991).
184. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2624 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Pos-
ner, supra note 138, at 1378-79.
185. Kramer, supra note 90, at 1797. Professor Kramer suggests that Justice Scalia adopts
the utter fiction of judges finding law, "something he must know to be false," in order to avoid the
"quagmire" of balancing relevant interests in retroactivity cases. Id. (emphasis in original). This
is part of an overall "tendency to simplify complicated questions." Id.
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Third, the most curious part of the argument for constitutionally man-
dated retroactivity is the claim that it will discourage overruling. Since
overruling is not itself constitutionally forbidden, it is strange to say that a
safeguard against it is a constitutional requirement. One might justify a
judge-made rule as protection against an unconstitutional practice. The ex-
clusionary rule is an example. It is peculiar to justify a purported constitu-
tional requirement as protection for a judge-made rule. In any event, this is
a policy argument, one that deems overruling basically bad and implicitly
balances its harms with the burdens and unfairness of retroactive decision-
making. This group of Justices would read it into the Constitution, but it is,
like stare decisis itself, merely a "principle of policy." Finally, this argu-
ment indicates a peculiar distrust of judges. The notion is that judges lack
the self-discipline to adhere to a general admonition to respect precedent,
but can be reigned in by penalizing transgressions. Justice Scalia has always
made it clear that he trusts no judges other than himself-as for example in
his uninhibited calls for overruling precedent but apparent confidence that
his own decisions will bind those who follow. As for Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, it is probably fair to say that they do not trust certain judges-
most obviously, their colleagues on the Court. They both consider overrul-
ing an evil, and Payne and Jim Beam are of a piece.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court frequently endorses a model of the judicial role in
which judges are mere dispute-resolvers, implementing the policy choices
made by the majoritarian instruments of government. The Court has in-
volved this model to justify its decisions about individual rights, statutory
construction, federalism, and separation of powers. Yet when put directly
to the test, the model collapses. Although reluctantly, the Court has ac-
knowledged that judges are policymakers and representatives, and has
claimed for itself legislative-type authority to reverse field and rule prospec-
tively. This inability to sustain the model under direct scrutiny suggests
that the model is flawed. This is not to say that a judge is a legislator. But
the choice is not between seeing judges as politicians in robes on the one
hand and mere referees on the other. The Court could pursue a more com-
plex vision of the role of judges in democratic government, one in which
judges, as public trustees, do have some responsibility for policy
development.
Notwithstanding this tension, these decisions do not disprove the valid-
ity of the Court's underlying model. The Court might conclude that judges
should always aim for apolitical neutrality, although they will always fall
short. Normative and descriptive models compete rather than conflict. In
[Vol. 75:725
VERSIONS OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE
each of these cases, the Court had to choose one or the other and opted for
the descriptive. The majorities were shifting. Within them, the two most
consistent Justices were White, who was concerned only with how courts
actually function, and Scalia, who was concerned only with how they are
supposed to (with the possible exception of his position in Payne). It is no
coincidence that these two are, respectively, the Court's leading functional-
ist and its leading formalist in separation of powers cases.
Was the Court right to fall back on the descriptive version of the judicial
function in each of these cases? All in all, the answer is yes. Chisom and
Gregory were both statutory cases. The precise question was therefore not
whether judges are representatives or policymakers in some general or theo-
retical sense, but whether Congress considered them as such. Thus, in
Chisom, Justice Scalia was at least asking the right question, although he
gave the wrong answer. If the statute gives no indication of whether the
normative or descriptive model ought to apply, the default rule should be
the latter. Congress should be presumed to legislate with regard to the
world as it is, not as it should be.
In a second setting, assessing the constitutionality of legislation about
judges, the normative view is equally out of place. The Court has had no
trouble taking the descriptive approach in examining state laws. This ap-
proach has been slightly more controversial with regard to the federal judi-
ciary, but in essence its functional approach amounts to a focus on the real
rather than the ideal.
The hardest question comes in cases like Payne and Jim Beam, which
involve self-imposed restraints. Here the argument for pursuit of the nor-
mative vision is strongest, for the Court should strive to achieve the noblest
role it has defined for itself. Yet it is here where the Court has most readily
ignored its own normative vision.
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